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ABSTRACT
The database contained in this thesis was put together from unclassified sources. It is
stored on computer disk using the Lotus 123 software program and is easily updated and
manipulated. This database was created to provide support to U.S. Naval arms control negotiators
in the event that the Navy is forced to the negotiating table.
This thesis does not advocate naval arms control. However, given the current political
climate it is prudent to be prepared for such an eventuality. This assessment utilizes a methodology
for determining excess naval forces of the Soviet Union that would be targetable in arms control
talks.
In order to quantify the excess, we constructed a Soviet naval model that would be
adequate to meet Soviet security goals under "defensive defense" doctrine. Our goal was not to
present the Soviet Union with a plan of action but to come up with a reasonable estimate of what
their force structure is likely to resemble. Again, it is the methodology which is important here, as
specific numbers can easily be changed using the Lotus program to account for classified
information or changing developments.
Once we established the current force levels and a model of likely forces necessary under
"defensive defense," it was easy to determine an excess of Soviet naval forces. Our findings are
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I. INTRODUCTION
Intelligence support is essential to naval arms control negotiations with the
Soviet Union. Given the dramatic changes in the world suggesting an end of the
cold war and the impatience of the American public to commence spending of the
"peace dividend," and despite the government's objection to naval arms control,
planners and policy makers in the United States Navy may yet end up at the
bargaining table with the Soviets. If the U.S. Navy ends up at the bargaining table,
it is better to have some idea what types of concessions on forces that it would like
to get from the U.S.S.R.
In this thesis, we specify a method for assessing any "excess" in the Soviet
naval inventory so as to quantitatively identify ships and submarines that may be
targeted by U.S. arms control negotiators. The methodology is employed to
calculate the number of currently available naval units and subtract from this
number what is actually needed by the Soviets to fulfill their new missions under
"defensive defense."
The first part of the problem was solved by applying the same methodology
used by James Tritten in his "Soviet Naval Data Base 1982-1983" (James John
Tritten, April 1983, RAND P-6859) and in his book Soviet Naval Forces and
Nuclear Warfare: Weapons, Employment, and Policy, (James J. Tritten, Westview
Press: Boulder, CO, 1986). From unclassified sources, we compile the numbers
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of ships and submarines and then assign them to various fleets. The ships are put
into classes as strategic, long range maritime and theater forces. Once this is
done, we must subtract the number of forces on routine deployment.
The result of the above is the total number of naval units available in each
of the fleets. This of course is an inflated number because all units will not be
available for war at any one time. No navy can put 100% of its fleet to sea. It is
therefore necessary to estimate a percentage of units available under various
threat conditions. This gives us a realistic view of what is available to the Soviets
in each circumstance.
In his book Prof. Tritten says, "The methodology will be directly usable for
any year."' We have done exactly this but have also entered the data into tables
using the Lotus 123 software package making the updating or substitution of
numbers much easier by follow-on researchers and students at NPS.
The second part of the problem is to estimate what the Soviet Navy requires
to accomplish its mission. To do this, we put ourselves in the position of the Soviet
General Staff: we accept the draft Soviet doctrine of defensive defense as
I Tritten, James John, "Soviet Navy Data Base: 1982-1983," RAND P-6859, April
1983, p. 3.
2
authoritative and predictive.2 We also accept the severe economic pressures in
the USSR that require a reduction in their armed forces. We then ask what do we
really need for defense of the homeland? Subtracting this number from the total
available will give an excess which should be the target of U.S. arms control
negotiations.
The unclassified sources used for the raw numbers and the fleet assignments
are:
1. Combat Fleets of the World, ed. Barnard Prezelin (English
language version prepared by A.D. Baker Ill): Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, MD, 1990, current through 1 January 1990.
2. Janes's Fighting Ships, ed. Richard Sharpe: Janes Information
Group, Inc.: Coulsdon, Surry, England, 1990, current through
October 1989.
3. The Military Balance, The International Institute for Strategic
Studies: London, current through 1 June 1990
These sources were chosen because they are unclassified, updated annually
and generally regarded as reliable.
2 "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR (Draft)," Moscow Voyennaya Mysl in
Russian, Special Issue, signed to press November 30,, 1990, pp. 24-28 (JPRS-
UMT-91-001-L, January 3, V,91, pp. 14-17); and Marshal of the Soviet Union
Dmitriy Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense, "USSR Ministry of Defense Draft
Military Reform Concept," Moscow Pravitelstvennyy Vestnik in Russian, No. 48,
November 1990, pp. 5-10 (FBIS-SOV-90-239, December 12, 1990, pp. 62-75; or
JPRS-UMA-90-028, December 17, 1990, pp. 52-70); or as published in Moscow
Voyennaya Mysl in Russian, Special Edition, signed to press November 30, 1990,
pp. 3-23 (JPRS-UMT-91-001-L, January 3, 1991, pp. 1-14).
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Based upon the final outcome, we suggest an approach to arms control
negotiations. Even though we should not be willing to sacrifice essential naval
assets to gain reductions in Soviet forces that will be made based on their new
policy and economic constraints, if forced to an arms control negotiation over
numbers of units, the U.S. Navy should have some idea what it would like to see
reduced on the Soviet side. The methodoolgy outlined in this thesis can be easily
adapted to classified data applied to internal government analysis.
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II. LOTUS
As mentioned in the introduction, we used the Lotus software package to
store and manipulate the data. This program allows us to do routine mathematical
calculations and update the data base on a routine basis. Each "cell" in the Lotus
spreadsheet is designated by its column ( a letter) and its row ( a number). The
cell may contain a numeric piece of data or a formula that may be any combination
of designated cells in mathematical operations or numbers.
The general characteristics of the Lotus 123 software program offer a range
of features that are well suited to this study and to further research. Once the data
is entered for a given year from the var;zjus sources it is quite an easy thing to
update the numbers in successive years. Even when a ship or submarine is
eliminated totally, deletion of the particular line does not upset the balance of the
data base or calculations in the later derived tables. The Lotus program
automatically updates all formulas. When a line is added however the task is only
slightly laborious. All formulas will update except those that specifically use the
newly inserted cell.
To accommodate for variation in the raw data reported by the unclassified
sources, and to facilitate quick results from "what if" scenarios, we have what we
call an assumed column. This column will not automatically be filled in with the
average value calculated by the Lotus program. It must be entered by the user of
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the program to ensure human intervention at critical stages. The number in the
assumed number column is the one used in subsequent formulas that are used
to manipulate the raw numbers and create the resulting tables. In most cases the
assumed number will be the calculated average value.
The actual commands are outlined in Appendix A but the general idea for use
of the data base is as follows. There are two programs. One is a template which
has only the raw data and formulas where none of the assumed numbers are
entered. This disc contains only the information and derived tables to assess the
present capabilities. The other data base is the one that we have used to obtain
our results. The recommended procedure for use is to copy the appropriate disc
and to go to work from there.
Finally, we suggest that the optimal data base would have all of the assets
of the Lotus program but not require one to actually use Lotus. This program
would have certain basic categories already preset to inquire about and then ask
one to define the subcategories of data and then to enter the raw numbers
obtained from the various sources. For example, the computer would ask What
types of ballistic missile submarines are to be considered? The user would supply
this information and our ideal program would then insert these categories in the
Lotus type spreadsheet. The computer would then ask how many are listed in
Jane's? It would then fill that number into the correct Lotus cell.
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III. TOTAL FORCE LEVELS
This section deals with the raw numbers from the various sources. We use
the same logic as used by Prof. Tritten in his 1982-83 Soviet Navy Data Base for
categorizing the assets of the Soviet Navy.3 We also include a glossary (Appendix
B) which is a slightly updated version of Prof. Tritten's.
These forces are divided into two groups: strategic and conventional. The
strategic forces consist of Soviet Ballistic missile submarines and the conventional
forces are all the rest. In our study, we will deal with the strategic forces in a
different manner than Prof. Tritten. As mentioned earlier his study was based on
an assumption of an aggressive Soviet naval posture and was concerned with how
much offensive power they could assemble under various conditions. Our study
assumes a defensive posture. Although we will be using different assumptions in
assessing Soviet needs as concerns their strategic forces, we include the
necessary tables and formula to assess their offensive capability.
The conventional forces are divided along the same lines as in Prof. Tritten's
study. The broad categories of assets are:
1. Long Range Maritime
2. Active Theater Maritime
Tritten, op. cit., pp. 4-5.
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3. Miscellaneous
The long range active forces are those surface ships over 1000 tons and the
deployable nuclear powered submarines and best diesels. These are the forces
capable of conducting sustained operations with limited support from land based
air assets.
The active theater forces are the naval forces that are under 1000 tons, and
non-missile carrying escorts. This conforms to the guidelines used in Prof. Tritten's
survey.
The miscellaneous forces are those that are used for research purposes or
are reserve units. These are not readily available for war fighting but need to be
considered in any total arms control negotiation. The forces listed here will not be
divided to various fleets as the other forces will be.
TABLE I
STRATEGIC FORCES




-Typhoon 6 6 6 6
- Delta IV 6 6 6 6 6
- Delta II 6 14 14 11 14
- Delta II 14 4 4 7 4
-Delta 1 4 18 18 13 18
- Yankee 11 18 1 1 7 1
- Yankee 1 1 14 14 10 14
- Hotel II1 14 1 8 1
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TABLE II
LONG RANGE MARITIME FORCES
Combat Jane's 1155 Average Assumed
STRIKE SUBMARINES 191 186
CRUISE-MISSILE ATTACK SUBMARINES 63 63
SSGN 49 49
- Yankee 1 1 1 1 1
- Papa 1 1 1 1
- Charlie i1 6 6 6 6 6
- Charlie I 9 10 9 9 9
- Oscar 11 3 4 4 4 4
- Oscar 1 2 2 2 2 2
-Echo II 28 28 22 26 26
SSG - Juliett 12 16 14 14 14
FLEET ATTACK SUBMARINES 128 123
SSN 70 65
- Akula 5 5 5 5 5
- Sierra 3 2 2 2 2
- Alpha 5 6 5 5 5
- Victor III 24 24 24 24 24
-Victor II 7 7 7 7 7
- Victor 1 16 16 16 16 16
- Yankee (notch) 2 3 2 2 2
- November 11 4 8 4
SS 58 58
- Foxtrot 38 44 39 40 40
-Tango 18 18 18 18 18
SURFACE STRIKE 33 34
CV - Tbilisi 1 1 1 1 1
CVHG 4 4
- Kiev 3 3 3 3 3
- Baku 1 1 1 1 1
CGN - Kirov 3 3 3 3 3
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TABLE II
LONG RANGE MARITIME FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed
CG 11 11
- Slava 3 3 3 3 3
- Kresta 1 4 4 4 4 4
-Kynda 4 4 4 4 4
CC/CL - Sverdlov 3 3 3 3
DDG - Sovremenny 11 12 12 12 12
SURFACE ASW 30 30
CHG -Moskva 2 2 2 2 2
CG 17 17
- Kara 6 7 7 7 7
- Kresta 11 10 10 10 10 10
DDG - Udaloy 11 11 11 11 11
SURFACE ESCORTS 55 55
DDG 17 17
- Kilden w SSM 1 1 1
- Kashin w SSM 4 3 4 4 4
-Kashin 13 13 10 12 12
FFG 38 38
- Krivak 111 5 5 5 5
- Krivak 11 11 11 11 11 11
-Krivak 1 21 21 21 21 21
- Balcom 1 1 1 1
MINE WARFARE 116 116
MCS 4 4
- Alesha 3 3 3 3 3
-Gorya 1 1 1 1 1
MCM - Polnochny A @ B 4 4 4
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TABLE II
LONG RANGE MARITIME FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed
MSF 108 108
-Natya 11 1 1 1 1 1
-Natya 1 34 34 34 34 34
- Yurka 41 44 45 43 43
- T 43 Class 30 29 30 30
AMPHIBIOUS 41 41
LPD - Ivan Rogov (522 troops) 3 3 3 3 3
LST 38 38
- Ropucha (225 troops) 25 24 24 24 24
- Alligator (300 troops) 14 14 14 14 14
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 225 239
BOMBERS 136 150
-Backfire 130 150 129 136 150
MPAASW 89 89
-Bear F 109 80 77 89 89
TABLE III
ACTIVE THEATER MARITIME FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed
THEATER BALUSTIC 2 2
MISSILE SUBMARINES
SSB -G II 2 2 2
ATTACK SUBMARINES 72 61
SSN - H II 12 6 9 6
SS 63 55
-K 30 15 15 20 14
-W 44 42 43 41
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TABLE III
ACTIVE THEATER MARITIME FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed
THEATER SURFACE 679 585
FF/FFL 146 145
-Koni 1 1 1 1 1
-Riga 28 20 15 21 21
-Petya I1 2 2 2
-Mod Petya 11 1 1 1 1 1
-Petya 11 18 11 10 13 10
-Mod Petya 1 11 8 7 9 9
- Petcha I 4 4 3 4
-Mirka 11 9 8 8 8 8
-Mirka 1 7 5 5 6 6
-Parchim 11 12 12 12 12 12
-Grisha V 13 14 11 13 13
-Grisha IV 1 1 1
- Grisha III 31 32 28 30 30
-Grisha 11 12 12 12
-Grisha 1 15 15 14 15 15
PATROL COMBATANTS 256 163
With Missiles 71 71
PGG 70 70
- Dergach 1 1 1
-Tarantul 111 16 13 13 14 14
-Tarantul 11 19 19 19 19 19
-Tarantul 1 2 2 2 2 2
-Nanuchka IV 1 1 1 1 1
-Nanuchka 1I 15 15 17 16 16
-Nanuchka 1 17 16 18 17 17
PPGH -Sarancha 1 1 1 1 1
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TABLE III
ACTIVE THEATER MARITIME FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed
Without missiles 185 92
PG 170 77
-Pauk 330 34 10 125 32
- Poti 49 44 40 44 44
- Svetlak 1 1 1 1
PGF - T-58 15 15 15
MINE WARFARE 240 239
MSF 109 109
- Gorya 1 1 1
-Natya II 1 1 1 1 1
- Natya 1 34 34 34 34 34
- Yurka 41 44 45 43 43
- T-43 30 29 30 30
MSC 131 130
- Andryusha 2 2 2 2 2
- Baltika 1 1 1 1
- Sasha 2 2 2
- Sonya 61 65 70 65 65
-Vanya 65 50 50 55 55
- Mod Vanya 3 3 3 3 3
- Zhenya 2 2 3 2 2
AMPHIBIOUS 38
LSM - Polnocny (180 troops) 35 43 36 38 38
THEATER AIRCRAFT 478 524
BOMBERS 171 200 140 170 200
-Badger 146 175 125 149 175
- Blinder 25 25 15 22 25
FIGHTER-BOMBERS 151 174 179 168 174
- Fitter 0 74 97 80 74
- Forger 81 100 79 87 100
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TABLE III
ACTIVE THEATER MARITIME FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed
MPA/ASW 138 150 130 139 150
-Mail 93 100 92 95 100
-May 45 50 38 44 50
TABLE IV
MISCELLANEOUS FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed
R&D BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBS 1 0
SSBN - H III 1 1 0
RESERVE ATTACK SUBMARINES 48 48
SS/SSC 48 48
- Foxtrot 15 10 13 13
- Whiskey 30 40 30 33 33
- Zulu IV 2 2 2 2
MISCELLANEOUS SUBMARINES 17 17
SSGN - Yankee Conversion 1 1 1 1 1
SSN 2 2
- Echo II Research 1 1 1
- X-Ray Research 1 1 1 1
SSQN - Hotel II Comms. 1 1 1 1
SSAN - Uniform Research 2 2 2 2
SSA 4 4
- Beluga Research 1 1 1 1 1
- India Salvage/Rescue 2 2 2 2 2
- Lima Research 1 1 1 1 1
SSQ - Golf I Comms. 3 3 3 3




Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed
MISCELLANEOUS SURFACE FORCES 97 97
Air Cushion Vehicles 82 82
- Pomornik 3 4 4 4 4
- Aist 20 20 20 20 20
- Tsaplya 4 5 6 5 5
-Lebed 20 20 20 20 20
-Gus 32 32 30 31 31
- Utenok 2 2 2 2
Wing-in-ground effect craft 4 4
- Orlan 3 3 3 3 3
- Utka 1 1 1 1
AXT 5 5
- Smolny 3 3 3 3
- Ugra 2 2 2 2
PGR 6 6
- T-58 3 3 3 3
- T-43 3 3 3
COASTAL COMBATANTS 196 144
With Missiles 138 85
PTGH - Matka 16 16 16 16 16
PTG 69 69
- OSA II 26 26 30 27 27
- OSA I 40 45 40 42 42
Without Missiles 58 59
PCSH 16 16
-Babuchka 1 1 1 1 1
- Muravey 14 15 15 15
PT - Shershen 3 3 3 3
PTH - Turya 29 31 30 30 30




Combat Jane's IISS Average Assumed]
RESERVE SURFACE 20 20
CC/CL - Sverdlov 3 2 3 3
DD -Skoryy 5 5 5
FF -Riga 5 5 5 5
PGR -T-43 2 2 2
MSF - T-43 5 5 5
KGB FORCES 154 155
WEE - Purga 1 1 1 1 1
WFFL - Grisha 11 12 12 12 12 12
PATROL/COASTAL COMBATANTS 141 142
WPGF - Ivan Susanin 6 7 7 7
WPCS 120 120
- So-i
-Stenka 115 122 120 119 119
- Svetlyak 1 1 1 1
WPCSH - Muravey 14 15 15 15
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IV. FLEET ASSIGNMENTS
Assignment of forces to the various fleets was accomplished by calculating
a percentage of the ships assigned from the three sources. In several instances,
due to the different ways that ships were grouped, there is some variation in the
percentage. For this reason we use an "assumed percentage" column. This is the
number that must be entered by the user of the program. The "assumed number"
is the calculated result using the assumed percentage and multiplying by the
assumed number for that ship type from the raw data tables.
In Prof. Tritten's data base, he cross checked his final results by calculating
the total number of all units of a particular category, for example submarines, that
were assigned to a particular fleet by a reference source. He then compared that
number to the sum of all Typhoons, Delta IV's, etc. derived from the fleet
assignment tables and prepared standard deviation tables to prove the accuracy
of this method.4
Though we did not perform these calculations for this study, it should be






Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
STRATEGIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES 8
SSBN 0.62 0.63 0.61 0.62 8
- Typhoon 0.62 0.62 4
DELTA/YANKEE 4
- Delta IV 0.62 0.62 4
- Delta III 0.62 0.62 9
- Delta 11 0.62 0.62 2
- Delta I 0.62 0.62 11
-Yankee II 0.62 0.62 1
-Yankee I 0.62 0.62 9
- Hotel III 0.62 0.62 1
STRIKE SUBMARINES 134
CRUISE-MISSILE ATTACK SUBMARINES 33
SSGN 0.57 0.54 0.59 0.57 28
-Yankee 0.57 0.57 1
- Papa 0.57 0.57 1
- Charlie II 0.57 0.57 3
- Charlie I 0.57 0.57 5
-Oscar II 0.57 0.57 2
- Oscar I 0.57 0.57 1
- Echo 1 0.57 0.57 15
SSG 0.43 0.31 0.36 0.37 5
- Juliett 0.37 0.37 5
FLEET ATTACK SUBMARINES 101
SSN 0.63 0.69 0.62 0.64 84
- Akula 0.64 0.64 3
- Sierra 0.64 0.64 1
- Alpha 0.64 0.64 46
- Victor 1i1 0.64 0.64 15
- Victor II 0.64 0.64 4
- Victor 1 0.64 0.64 10
-Yankee (notch) 0.64 0.64 1




Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
SS 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.28 16
- Foxtrot 0.28 0.28 11
- Tango 0.28 0.28 5
SURFACE STRIKE 8
CV 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0
- Tbilisi 1.00 1.00 0
CVHG 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.44 0
- Kiev 0.44 0.50 0
- Baku 0.44 0.50 0
CGN 0.10 0.33 0.22 1
- Kirov 0.22 0.33 1
CG 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.37 4
- Slava 0.37 0.37 1
- Kresta 1 0.37 0.37 1
- Kynda 0.37 0.37 1
CC/CL 0.00 0.00 0
- Sverdlov 0.00 0.00 0
DDG 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.27 3
- Sovremenny 0.27 0.27 3
SURFACE ASW 9
CHG 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.11 0
- Moskva 0.00 0
CG 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.37 6
- Kara 0.37 0.37 3
- Kresta II 0.37 0.37 4
DDG 0.25 0.31 0.27 C.27 0.27 3
- Udaloy
SURFACE ESCORTS 13
DDG 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.27 5
Kilden DD w SSM 0.27 0.27 0
- Kashin w SSM 0.27 0.27 1
- Kashin 0.27 0.27 3




Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
FFG 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.23 9
- Krivak 1II 0.23 0.23 1
- Krivak II 0.23 0.23 3
- Krvak I 0.23 0.23 5
- Balcom 0.23 0.23 0
MINE WARFARE 0.17 0.20 0.18 21
MCS 1
- Alesha 0.18 0.18 1
- Gorya 0.18 0.18 0
MCM - Polnochny A @ B 0.18 0.18 1
MSF 0.18 0.18 19
- Natya II 0.18 0.18 0
- Natya I 0.18 0.18 6
- Yurka 0.18 0.18 8
- T 43 Class 0.18 0.18 5
AMPHIBIOUS 9
LPD 0.00 0.19 0.10 0
- Ivan Rogov (522 troops) 0.10 0.10 0
LST 0.24 0.19 0.22 8
- Ropucha (225 troops) 0.22 0,22 5
- Alligator (300 troops) 0.22 0.22 3
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 61
BOMBERS 0.15 0.19 0.17 26
- Backfire 0.17 0.17 26
MPA!ASW 0.41 0.39 0.40 36
- Bear F 0.40 0.40 36
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 0.00 0.63 0.61 0.41 4
SUBMARINES
SSBN - H II 0.41 0.60 4
SSB -GIl 0.41 0.60 0
ATTACK SUBMARINES 15
SS 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.28 15
-K 0.28 0.28 4




Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
THEATER SURFACE 38
FF/FFL 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.26 38
- Koni 0.26 0.26 0
- Riga 0.26 0.26 5
- Petya III 0.26 0.26 1
- Mod Petya II 0.26 0.26 0
- Petya II 0.26 0.26 3
- Mod Petya I 0.26 0.26 2
- Petcha I 0.26 0.26 1
- Mirka II 0.26 0.26 2
- Mirka I 0.26 0.26 2
- Parchim II 0.26 0.26 3
- Grisha V 0.26 0.26 3
- Grisha IV 0.26 0.26 0
- Grisha III 0.26 0.26 8
- Grisha II 0.26 0.26 3
- Grisha I 0.26 0.26 4
PATROL COMBATANTS 13
With Missiles 7
PGG 0.07 0.10 0.08 7
Dergach 0.08 0.08 0
Utka 0.08 0.08 1
Tarantul I1 0.08 0.08 1
Tarantul II 0.08 0.08 2
Tarantul I 0.08 0.08 0
Nanuchka IV 0.08 . 0.08 0
- Nanuchka III 0.08 0.08 1
- Nanuchka I 0.08 0.08 1
PPG 0.07 0.10 0.08 0
- Sarancha 0.08 0.08 0
Without missiles 6
PG 0.07 0.10 0.08 6
- Pauk 0.08 0.08 3
- Poti 0.08 0.08 4




Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
MINE WARFARE 43
MSF 0.17 0.20 0.18 20
- Gorya 0.18 0.18 0
- Natya II 0.18 0.18 0
- Natya I 0.18 0.18 6
- Yurka 0.18 0.18 8
- T-43 0.18 0.18 5
MSC 0.17 0.20 0.18 23
- Andryusha 0.18 0.18 0
- Baltika 0.18 0.18 0
- Sasha 0.18 0.18 0
- Sonya 0.18 0.18 12
-Vanya 0.18 0.18 10
- Mod Vanya 0.18 0.18 1
- Zhenya 0.18 0.18 0
AMPHIBIOUS 7
LSM 0.16 0.19 0.18 7
- Polnochny (180 troops) 0.18 0.18 7
THEATER AIRCRAFT 124
BOMBERS 0.14 0.19 0.17 34
-Badger 0.17 0.17 30
- Blinder 0.17 0.17 4
FIGHTER-BOMBERS 0.18 0.19 0.19 30
- Fitter 0.19 0.17 13
-Forger 0.19 0.17 17
MPA/ASW 0.41 0.39 0.40 60
- Mail 0.40 0.40 40




Combat Jane's IISS Avg Assumed Assumed #
STRATEGIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES 24
SSBN 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.38 24
- Typhoon 0.38 0.38 2
DELTA/YANKEE 0.38 22
- Delta IV 0.38 0.38 2
- Delta III 0.38 0.38 5
- Delta II 0.38 0.38 2
- Delta I 0.38 0.38 7
- Yankee II 0.38 0.38 0
- Yankee 1 0.38 0.38 5
- Hotel III 0.38 0.38 0
STRIKE SUBMARINES 91
CRUISE-MISSILE ATTACK SUBMARINES 33
SSGN 0.57 0.54 0.59 0.57 28
- Yankee 0.57 0.57 1
-Papa 0.57 0.57 1
- Charlie II 0.57 0.57 3
- Charlie I 0.57 0.57 5
- Oscar II 0.57 0.57 2
- Oscar I 0.57 0.57 1
- Echo I 0.57 0.57 15
SSG 0.43 0.31 0.36 0.37 5
-Juliett 0.37 0.37 5
FLEET ATTACK SUBMARINES 58
SSN 0.63 0.69 0.62 0.64 42
- Akula 0.64 0.64 3
-Sierra 0.64 0.64 1
-Alpha 0.64 0.64 3
- Victor I11 0.64 0.64 15
- Victor II 0.64 0.64 4
- Victor I 0.64 0.64 10
- Yankee (notch) 0.64 0.64 1




Combat Jane's IISS Avg Assumed Assumed #
SS 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.28 16
- Foxtrot 0.28 0.28 11
-Tango 0.28 0.28 5
SURFACE STRIKE 10
cv 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.17 0
- Tbilisi 0.17 0.17 0
CVHG 0.33 0.50 0.50 0.44 2
- Kiev 0.44 0.50 2
-Baku 0.44 0.50 1
CGN 0.10 0.33 0.14 1
- Kirov 0.14 0.33 1
CG 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.37 4
- Slava 0.37 0.37 1
- Kresta I 0.37 0.37 1
- Kynda 0.37 0.37 1
CC/CL 0 0.00 0
- Sverdlov 0.00 0.00 0
DDG 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.27 3
- Sovremenny 0.27 0.27 3
SURFACE ASW 9
CHG 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0
* Moskva 0.33 0.00 0
CG 0.33 0.36 0.43 0.37 0.37 6
- Kara 0.37 0.37 3
- Kresta II 0.37 0.37 4
DDG 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.27 3
-Udaloy 0.27 0.27 3
SURFACE ESCORTS 19
DDG 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.27 5
- Kilden DD w SSM 0.27 0.27 0
- Kashin w SSM 0.27 0.27 1
-Kashin 0.27 0.27 3




Combat Jane's IISS Avg Assumed Assumed #
FFG 0.21 0.24 0.71 0.39 15
- Krivak III 0.39 0.39 2
- Krivak II 0.39 0.39 4
- Krivak I 0.39 0.39 8
- Balcom 0.39 0.39 0
MINE WARFARE 80
MCS 0.17 0.20 0.18 1
- Alesha 0.18 0.18 1
- Gorya 0.18 0.18 0
MCM - Polnochny A @ 8 0.18 0.18 10
MSF 0.18 19
- Natya I 0.18 0.18 0
- Natya I 0.18 0.18 6
- Yurka 0.18 0.18 8
- T 43 Class 0.18 0.18 5
AMPHIBIOUS 9
LPD 1.00 0.19 0.60 0
- Ivan Rogov (522 troops) 0.60 0.10 0
LST 0.24 0.19 0.22 8
- Ropucham (225 troops) 0.22 0.22 5
- Alligator (300 troops) 0.22 0.22 3
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 72
BOMBERS 0.33 0.33 0.22 50
- Backfire 0.22 0.33 50
MPAASW 0.37 0.39 0.25 0.25 23
_ Bear F 0.25 23
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 0.63 0.61 0.62 4
SUBMARINES
SSBN - H II 0.62 0.62 4
SSB -GII 0.62 0.62 0
ATTACK SUBMARINES 15
SS 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.28 15
-K 0.28 0.28 4




Combat Jane's IISS Avg Assumed Assumed #
THEATER SURFACE 23
FF/FFL 0.29 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.26 23
-Koni 0.26 0.26 0
- Riga 0.26 0.26 5
-Petya III 0.26 0.26 1
- Mod Petya II 0.26 0.26 0
- Petya II 0.26 0.26 3
- Mod Petya I 0.26 0.26 2
- Petcha I 0.26 0.26 1
-Mirka II 0.26 0.26 2
-Mirka I 0.26 0.26 2
- Parchim II 0.26 0.26 3
-Grisha V 0.26 0.26 3
- Grisha IV 0.26 0.26 0
- Grisha III 0.26 0.26 8
- Grisha II 0.26 0.26 3
- Grisha I 0.26 0.26 4
PATROL COMBATANTS 13
With Missiles 6
PGG 0.07 0.10 0.08 6
Dergach 0.08 0.08 0
Utka 0.08 0.08
Tarantul I1 0.08 0.08 1
Tarantul II 0.08 0.08 2
Tarantul I 0.08 0.08 0
Nanuchka IV 0.08 0.08 0
Nanuchka 11 0.08 0.08 1
- Nanuchka I 0.08 0.08 1
PPGH 0.07 0.10 0.08 0




Combat Jane's IISS Avg Assumed Assumed #
Without missiles 7
PG 0.07 0.10 0.08 6
- Pauk 0.08 0.08 3
- Poti 0.08 0.08 4
- Svetlak 0.08 0.08 0
PGF -T-58 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 1
MINE WARFARE 43
MSF 0.17 0.20 0.18 20
- Gorya 0.18 0.18 0
* Natya II 0.18 0.18 0
- Natya I 0.18 0.18 6
- Yurka 0.18 0.18 8
- T-43 0.18 0.18 5
MSC 0.17 0.20 0.18 23
- Andryusha 0.18 0.18 0
- Baltika 0.18 0.18 0
- Sasha 0.18 0.18 0
- Sonya 0.18 0.18 12
- Vanya 0.18 0.18 10
- Mod Vanya 0.18 0.18 1
- Zhenya 0.18 0.18 0
AMPH IBIOUS 4
LSM 0.16 0.19 0.12 4
- Polnochny (180 troops) 0.12 0.17 4
THEATER AIRCRAFT 194
BOMBERS 0.33 0.33 0.33- 66
- Badger 0.33 0.33 57
- Blinder 0.33 0.33 8
FIGHTER-BOMBERS 0.49 0.33 0.41 71
- Fitter 0.41 0.33 30
- Forger 0.41 0.33 41
MPA/ASW 0.37 0.39 0.38 57
- Mail 0.38 0.38 38
- May 0.38 0.38 19
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TABLE VII
BLACK SEA FLEET FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
STRATEGIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES 0
SSBN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Typhoon 0.00 0.00 0
DELTNYANKEE 0.00 0
- Delta IV 0.00 0.00 0
- Delta III 0.00 0.00 0
- Delta II 0.00 0.00 0
- Delta I 0.00 0.00 0
- Yankee II 0.00 0.00 0
- Yankee 1 0.00 0.00 0
-Hotel III 0.00 0.00 0
STRIKE SUBMARINES 9
CRUISE-MISSILE ATTACK SUBMARINES 2
SSGN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Yankee 0.00 0.00 0
- Papa 0.00 0.00 0
- Charlie II 0.00 0.00 0
- Charlie I 0.00 0.00 0
-Oscar II 0.00 0.00 0
- Oscar I 0.00 0.00 0
- Echo I 0.00 0.00 0
SSG 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 2
- Juliett 0.14 0.14 2
FLEET ATTACK SUBMARINES 9
SSN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Akula 0.00 0.00 0
- Sierra 0.00 0.00 0
- Alpha 0.00 0.00 0
- Victor III 0.00 0.00 0
- Victor II 0.00 0.00 0
- Victor 1 0.00 0.00 0
- Yankee (notch) 0.00 0.00 0
- November 0.00 0.00 0
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TABLE VII
BLACK SEA FLEET FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
SSG 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.16 9
- Foxtrot 0.16 0.16 6
-Tango 0.16 0.16 3
SURFACE STRIKE 7
CV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Tbilisi 0.00 0.00 0
CVHG 0.33 0.25 0.25 0.28 1
- Kiev 0.28 0.28 1
- Baku 0.28 0.28 0
CGN 0.23 0.00 0.12 0
- Kirov 0.12 0.00 0
CG 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.21 2
- Slava 0.21 0.21 1
- Kresta I 0.21 0.21 1
- Kynda 0.21 0.21 1
CC/CL 0.00 0.00 0
- Sverdlov 0.00 0.00 0
DDG 0.30 0.23 0.37 0.30 4
- Sovremenny 0.30 0.30 4
SURFACE ASW 7
CHG 0.33 1.00 0.67 0
- Moskva 0.67 0.10 0
CG 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.21 4
- Kara 0.21 0.21 1
- Kresta II 0.21 0.21 2
DDG 0.30 0.23 0.37 0.30 3
- Udaloy 0.30 0.30 3
SURFACE ESCORTS 15
DDG 0.30 0.23 0.37 0.30 5
- Kilden DD w SSM 0.30 0.30 0
- Kashin w SSM 0.30 0.30 1
- Kashin 0.30 0.30 4
- Kanin 0.30 0.30 0
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TABLE VII
BLACK SEA FLEET FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
FFG 0.30 0.24 0.73 0.43 10
- Krivak I1 0.43 0.27 1
- Krivak II 0.43 0.27 3
- Krivak I 0.43 0.27 6
- Balcom 0.43 0.27 0
MNE WARFARE 23
MCS 0.22 0.19 0.20 1
- Alesha 0.20 0.20 1
- Gorya 0.20 0.20 0
MCM - Polnochny A @ B 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.20 1
MSF 0.22 0.19 0.20 22
Natya II 0.20 0.20 0
- Natya I 0.20 0.20 7
- Yurka 0.20 0.20 9
T 43 Class 0.20 0.20 6
AMPHIBIOUS 8
LPD 0.00 0.19 0.10 0
- Ivan Rogov (522 troops) 0.10 0.00 0
LST 0.21 0.19 0.20 8
Ropucha (225 troops) 0.20 0.20 5
- Alligator (300 troops) 0.20 0.20 3
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 65
BOMBERS 0.26 0.29 0.27 41
- Backfire 0.27 0.27 41
MPA/ASW 0.12 0.13 0.13 24
_ Bear F 0.13 0.27 24
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES 0
SSBN -HII 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
SSB -GIl 0.00 0.00 0
ATTACK SUBMARINES 9.
SS 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.16 9
-K 0.16 0.16 2
-w 0.16 0.16 7
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TABLE VII
BLACK SEA FLEET FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
THEATER SURFACE 36
FF/FFL 0.27 0.24 0.25 36
- Koni 0.25 0.25 0
- Riga 0.25 0.25 5
- Petya III 0.25 0.25 1
- Mod Petya II 0.25 0.25 0
- Petya II 0.25 0.25 3
- Mod Petya I 0.25 0.25 2
- Petcha I 0.25 0.25 1
- Mirka 1i 0.25 0.25 2
- Mirka I 0.25 0.25 2
Parchim II 0.25 0.25 3
- Grisha V 0.25 0.25 3
- Grisha IV 0.25 0.25 0
- Grisha III 0.25 0.25 8
- Grisha II 0.25 0.25 3
- Grisha I 0.25 0.25 4
PATROL COMBATANTS 24
With Missii.3s 11
PGG 0.09 0.20 0.15 11
- Dergach 0.15 0.15 0
- Utka 0.15 0.15
- Tarantul III 0.15 0.15 2
- Tarantul II 0.15 0.15 3
- Tarantul I 0.15 0.15 0
- Nanuchka IV 0.15 0.15 0
- Nanuchka III 0.15 0.15 2
- Nanuchka I 0.15 0.15 3
PPGH 0.09 0.20 0.15 0
- Sarancha 0.15 0.15 0
Without missiles 14
PG 0.09 0.20 0.15 12
- Pauk 0.15 0.15 5
- Poti 0.15 0.15 7
- Svetlak 0.15 0.15 0
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TABLE VII
BLACK SEA FLEET FORCES
Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
PGF - T-58 0.09 0.20 0.15 0.15 2
MINE WARFARE 48
MSF 0.22 0.19 0.20 22
- Gorya 0.20 0.20 0
- Natya II 0.20 0.20 0
- Natya I 0.20 0.20 7
- Yurka 0.20 0.20 9
- T-43 0.20 0.20 6
MSC 0.22 0.19 0.20 26
- Andryusha 0.20 0.20 0
- Baltika 0.20 0.20 0
- Sasha 0.20 0.20 0
- Sonya 0.20 0.20 13
- Vanya 0.20 0.20 11
- Mod Vanya 0.20 0.20 1
- Zhenya 0.20 0.20 0
AMPHIBIOUS 14
LSM 0.47 0.19 0.38 0.35 14
- Polnochny (180 troops) 0.38 0.38 14
THEATER AIRCRAFT 126
BOMBERS 0.29 0.29 58
- Badger 0.29 0.29 51
- Blinder 0.29 0.29 7
FIGHTER-BOMBERS 0.26 0.29 0.28 49
- Fitter 0.28 0.28 21
- Forger 0.28 0.28 28
MPA/ASW 0.12 0.13 0.13 20
- Mail 0.13 0.13 13




Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
STRATEGIC-MISSILE SUBMARINES 21
SSBN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Typhoon 0.00 0.00 0
DELTA/YANKEE 0.00 0
-Delta IV 0.00 0.00 0
- Delta III 0.00 0.00 0
- Delta II 0.00 0.00 0
- Delta I 0.00 0.00 0
- Yankee II 0.00 0.00 0
-Yankee I 0.00 0.00 0
- Hotel III 0.00 0.00 0
STRIKE SUBMARINES 21
CRUISE-MISSILE ATTACK SUBMARINES 4
SSGN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Yankee 0.00 0.00 0
- Papa 0.00 0.00 0
- Charlie II 0.00 0.00 0
- Charlie I 0.00 0.00 0
-Oscar I1 0.00 0.00 0
-Oscar I 0.00 0.00 0
-Echol 0.00 0.00 0
SSG 0.21 0.31 0.29 0.27 4
- Juliett 0.27 0.27 4
FLEET ATTACK SUBMARINES 17
SSN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Akula 0.00. 0.00 0
- Sierra 0.00 0.00 0
- Alpha 0.00 0.00 0
- Victor I11 0.00 0.00 0
- Victor II 0.00 0.00 0
- Victor I 0.00 0.00 0
- Yankee (notch) 0.00 0.00 0




Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
SS 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.30 17
- Foxtrot 0.30 0.30 12
- Tango 0.30 0.30 5
SURFACE STRIKE 5
CV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Tbilisi 0.00 0.00 0
CVHG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Kiev 0.00 0.00 0
- Baku 0.00 0.00 0
CGN 0.10 0.33 0.22 1
- Kirov 0.22 0.33 1
CG 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.09 1
- Slava 0.09 0.09 0
- Kresta I 0.09 0.09 0
-Kynda 0.09 0.09 0
CC/CL 0.33 0.33 1
- Sverdlov 0.33 0.33 1
DDG 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.18 2
L Sovremenny 0.18 0.18 2
SURFACE ASW 4
CHG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
- Moskva 0.00 0.00 0
CG 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.09 2
Kara 0.09 0.09 1
- Kresta ii 0.09 0.09 1
DDG 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.18 2
- Udaloy 0.18 0.18 2
SURFACE ESCORTS 11
DDG 0.18 0.21 0.17 0.18 3
- Kilden DD w SSM 0.18 0.18 0
- Kashin w SSM 0.18 0.18 1
- Kashin 0.18 0.18 2




Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
FFG 0.21 0.18 0.60 0.33 8
- Krivak III 0.33 0.20 1
- Krivak II 0.33 0.20 2
SKrivak I 0.33 0.20 4
- Balcom 0.33 0.20 0
MINE WARFARE 41
MCS 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35 1
- Alesha 0.35 0.35 1
- Gorya 0.35 0.35 0
MCM Polnochny A @ B 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35 1
MSF 0.34 0.36 0.35 38
- Natya II 0.35 0.35 0
- Natya J 0.35 0,35 12
- Yurka 0.35 0.35 15
ST 43 Class 0.35 0.35 11
AMPHIBIOUS 9
LPD 0.00 0.27 0.14 0
- Ivan Rogov (522 troops) 0.14 0.00 0
LST 0.21 0.27 0.24 9
- Ropucha (225 troops) 0.24 0.24 6
- Alligator (300 troops) 0.24 0.24 3
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 38
BOMBERS 0.26 0.19 0.23 30
- Backfire 0.23 0.20 30
MPA/ASW 0.10 0.09 0.23 8
. Bear F 0.23 0.09 8
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES 0
SSBN - H II 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0
SSB - G II 0.50 1.00 0.75 0.00 0
ATTACK SUBMARINES 17
SS 0.30 0.28 0.32 0.30 17
-K 0.30 0.30 4





Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
FF/FFL 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 28
-Koni 0.19 0.19 0
- Riga 0.19 0.19 4
- Petya l 0.19 0.19 0
- Mod Petya II 0.19 0.19 0
- Petya II 0.19 0.19 2
- Mod Petya I 0.19 0.19 2
- Petcha I 0.19 0.19 1
- Mirka II 0.19 0.19 2
- Mirka I 0.19 0.19 1
- Parchim II 0.19 0.19 2
- Grisha V 0.19 0.19 2
- Grisha IV 0.19 0.19 0
- Grisha III 0.19 0.19 6
- Grisha II 0.19 0.19 2
- Grisha I 0.19 0.19 3
PATROL COMBATANTS 41
With Missiles 18
PGG 0.13 0.38 0.25 18
- Dergach 0.25 0.25 0
- Utka 0.25 0.25
- Tarantul III 0.25 0.25 4
- Tarantul II 0.25 0.25 5
- Tarantul I 0.25 0.25 1
- Nanuchka IV 0.25 0.25 0
- Nanuchka III 0.25 0.25 4
- Nanuchka I 0.25 0.25 4
PPGH 0.13 0.38 0.25 0
- Sarancha 0.25 0.25 0
Without missiles 23
PG 0.13 0.38 0.25 19
- Pauk 0.25 0.25 8
- Poti 0.25 0.25 11
- Svetlak 0.25 0.25 0




Combat Jane's IISS Avg. Assumed Assumed #
MINE WARFARE 167
MSF 0.34 0.36 0.35 121
- Gorya 0.35 0.35 83
- Natya II 0.35 0.35 0
- Natya I 0.35 0.35 12
- Yurka 0.35 0.35 15
- T-43 0.35 0.35 11
MSC 0.34 0.36 0.35 46
- Andryusha 0.35 0.35 1
- Baltika 0.35 0.35 0
- Sasha 0.35 0.35 1
-Sonya 0.35 0.35 23
- Vanya 0.35 0.35 19
- Mod Vanya 0.35 0.35 1
-Zhenya 0.35 0.35 1
AMPHIBIOUS 10
LSM 0.23 0.27 0.25 10
- Polnochny (180 troops) 0.25 0.25 10
THEATER AIRCRAFT 74
BOMBERS 0.26 0.19 0.23 40
Badger 0.23 0.20 35
Blinder 0.13 0.20 5
FIGHTER-BOMBERS 0.33 0.19 0.26 20
- Fitter 0.26 0.20 20
- Forger 0.26 0.20 0
MPA/ASW 0.10 0.09 0.09 14
- Mail 0.09 0.09 9
- May 0.09 0.09 5
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V. SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS
To accurately reflect the forces available in each of the Soviet Fleets it is
necessary to account for those units that are forward deployed. Soviet naval
deployments have greatly reduced in number since the writing of Prof. Tritten's
book. Some sources suggest as much as 20-30% of 1985 levels. In constructing
this table we make two basic assumptions. First, that future force structure will be
based on the idea of "defensive defense," and second that 1985 deployment levels
were lower than 1982 levels.5
Even with a strictly defensive doctrine, the Soviet Navy will maintain some
of its deployments simply to show the flag or as a show of force in areas such as
the Persian Gulf where they have interests. For this reason we have adopted the
traditional deployment areas of the Soviets and from Prof. Tritten's data base
shown the 1982 levels. To this number, we apply a percentage in this case we
have chosen 50%. The result is given in the column titled "Present level." The user
who disagrees with this percentage may simply change the formula to see how this
affects the result.6
5 Ibid., pp. 26-29.
6 various sources
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5. South China Sea
6. West Africa Patrol
7. Caribbean Sea
8. Caspian Sea
The data is presented here in two tables. First, the number of units deployed
is assessed by area of deployment. The next table shows the impact of these
deployments on the various fleets. In the first table, there is a column called
assumed number. Again this column must be input by the user. It is the number
that is used to calculate the impact to the individual fleets. It is the summations of
the unit types in this table that are used in subsequent calculations.
Because the Soviet Union is pulling back we have further assumed that the
Indian Ocean deployment will be limited to submarine forces. This is not to say
that there will be no surface ships in this area, but that deployed Pacific Fleet units
will occasionally frequent the area. We also assume no deployment to South China
Sea, West Africa Patrol, Carribean and Caspian. These will be picked up by
occasional visits from major deployment areas.
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TABLE IX
SOVIET NAVY FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS
Location 83 Level Present Assumed Assumed
Level Number Home Fleet
Atlantic Ocean
STRATEGIC SUBMARINES 3 3
SSBN (Typhoon) 2 1 1 Northern
SSBN (Delta/Yankee) 3 2 2 Northern
STRIKE SUBMARINES 2 2
SSGN/SSG 1 1 1 Northern
SSN/SS 2 1 1 Northern
ATTACK SUBMARINES - SSN/SS 13 7 6 Northern
SURFACE STRIKE 2 1 2 Northern
SURFACE ESCORTS 3 2 2 Baltic
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 1 1 1 Baltic
Pacific Ocean
STRATEGIC SUBMARINES 1 2
SSBN (Typhoon) 1 1 1 Pacific
SSBN (Delta/Yankee) 1 1 1 Pacific
STRIKE SUBMARINES 2 2
SSGN/SSG 1 1 1 Pacific
SSN/SS 2 1 1 Pacific
ATTACK SUBMARINES - SSN/SS 2 1 1 Pacific
SURFACE STRIKE 1 1 1 Pacific
SURFACE ASW 1 1 1 Pacific
SURFACE ESCORTS 1 1 1 Pacific
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 1 1 1 Pacific
MINESWEEPERS 1 1 1 Pacific
Mediterranean Sea,
STRIKE SUBMARINES 2 2
SSGN/SSG 3 2 2 Northern
ATTACK SUBMARINES - SSN/SS 10 5 5 Northern
SURFACE STRIKE 4 2 2 Black Sea
SURFACE ASW 5 3 3 Black Sea
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TABLE IX
SOVIET NAVY FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS
Location 83 Level Present Assumed Assumed
Level Number Home Fleet
SURFACE ESCORTS 5 3 3 Black Sea
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 3 2 2 Black Sea
MINESWEEPERS 3 2 2 Black Sea
PATROL SHIPS 2 1 1 Black Sea
Indian Ocea
STRIKE SUBMARINES 1 2
SSGN/SSG 1 1 1 Pacific
SSN/SS 1 1 1 Pacific
SURFACE STRIKE 1 1 0 Pacific
SURFACE ASW 2 1 0 Pacific
SURFACE ESCORTS 2 1 0 Pacific
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 2 1 0 Pacific
MINESWEEPERS 1 1 0 Pacific
THEATER RANGE AIRCRAFT SOME Black Sea
South China Sea
ATTACK SUBMARINES - SSN/SS 7 4 2 Pacific
SURFACE STRIKE 1 1 1 Pacific
SURFACE ASW 3 2 1 Pacific
SURFACE ESCORTS 2 1 1 Pacific
MINESWEEPERS 1 1 1 Pacific
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 4 2 2 Pacific
West Africa Patrol
SURFACE ESCORTS 1 1 0 Baltic Sea
AMPHIBIOUS 1 1 0 Baltic Sea
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT SOME Northern
Caribbea Sea
SUBMARINES 1 1 0 Northern or
Baltic




SOVIET NAVY FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS
Location 83 Level Present Assumed Assumed
Level Number Home Fleet
SURFACE ASW 1 1 0 Northern or
Baltic
SURFACE ESCORTS 1 1 0 Northern or
Baltic
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT SOME Northern or
Baltic
Caspian Sea
SUBMARINES SOME Black Sea
SURFACE ESCORTS SOME Black Sea
MINESWEEPERS 2 1 0 Black Sea
OTHERS UNKNOWN Black Sea
SUknoww~arious
SUBMARINES UNKNOWN Baltic
SURFACE STRIKE 1 1 0 Black Sea
SURFACE ASW SOME Black Sea
SURFACE ESCORTS SOME Black Sea
TABLE X
IMPACT OF FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS/TRANSIT FORCES
[Home Fleet Type Unit Number Deployed Location
Northern SSBN (Typhoon) 0 Atlantic







SURFACE STRIKE 2 Atlantic
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TABLE X
IMPACT OF FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS/TRANSIT FORCES
[Home Fleet Type Unit Number Deployed Location
SURFACE ASW Atlantic
SURFACE ESCORTS 1 Atlantic
Various unknown unknown
Long Range Aircraft
MPANASW 0 West Africa/Caribbean
Pacific SSBN (Typhoon) 0 Pacific
SSBN (Delta/Yankee) 2 Pacific
SSGN/SSG 1 Pacific
SSGN/SSG 0 Indian Ocean
SSN/SS 2 Pacific
SSN/SS 1 Pacific
SSN/SS 2 Indian Ocean
SSN/SS 0 South China Sea
SURFACE STRIKE 1 Pacific
SURFACE STRIKE 1 Indian Ocean
SURFACE STRIKE 0 South China Sea
SURFACE ASW 1 Pacific
SURFACE ASW 1 Indian Ocean
SURFACE ASW 2 South China Sea
SURFACE ESCORTS 1 Pacific
SURFACE ESCORTS 0 Indian Ocean
SURFACE ESCORTS 1 South China Sea
AMPHIBIOUS 1 Pacific
AMPHIBIOUS 0 Indian Ocean
MINESWEEPERS 1 Pacific
MINESWEEPERS 0 Indian Ocean
MINESWEEPERS 1 South China Sea
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 1 South China Sea
Black Sea SUBMARINES unknown unknown
SURFACE STRIKE 2 Mediterranean
SURFACE STRIKE 0 unknown
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TABLE X
IMPACT OF FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS/TRANSIT FORCES
Home Fleet Type Unit Number Deployed Location
SURFACE ASW 5 Mediterranean
SURFACE ASW 0 unknown
SURFACE ESCORTS 2 Mediterranean
SURFACE ESCORTS 0 Caspian Sea




PATROL COMBATANTS 2 Mediterranean
THEATER AIRCRAFT 0 Indian Ocean
OTHER 0 Caspian Sea
Baltic SUBMARINES 0 unknown
SURFACE ESCORTS 6 Atlantic
Baltic SURFACE ESCORTS 0 West Africa Patrol
SURFACE ESCORTS 0 Caribbean
SURFACE STRIKE 0 Caribbean
SURFACE ASW 0 Caribbean
AMPHIBIOUS 1 Atlantic
AMPHIBIOUS 0 West Africa Patrol
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 0 Caribbean
LST (260) 0 West Africa Patrol
Various 0 Unknown
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VI. CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
We now have all the elements to assess the Soviet Navy active contiguous
water capability. It is important to keep in mind that these tables do not include the
miscellaneous forces. This is a departure from Prof. Tritten's data base. Because
Tritten's study was aimed at a total threat assessment, he needed to represent
what amount of reserve and other units in temporary maintenance status were
able to go to sea in war. In our study, we present a theoretical force structure for
the Soviets and see how those needs are met with active forces. Our final
assessment will supplement active forces from the miscellaneous forces if
necessary or eliminate active and reserve, i.e. miscellaneous forces where a
surplus is found.
Although miscellaneous forces are not accounted for in this table the basic
idea is still the same as with Prof. Tritten's data base. He looked at two threat
environments. One environment is a peace time situation with relatively good
relations. The other is a higher alert environment in which tensions are high.
Within each threat environment, Prof. Tritten estimates two types of Soviet
capabilities. One is the ability to strike with little warning called a rapid surge
capability. And the other a mobilization capability, in which there may be several
months to prepare. Again, though Prof. Tritten's study is geared toward assessing
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offensive capability, these categories of threat level and conditions for sortie ability
are equally applicable to a defensive role.7
The following table shows the percentages chosen to estimate the forces
available in each situation. This is a Lotus table and is used to generate the
Contiguous Water Capability Table. A total threat assessment must incorporate
percentages for miscellaneous and reserve units. The contiguous water capability
for each fleet is calculated by multiplying the raw number from Tables V through
VIII by the percentage for the given threat level and capability desired, Table XI,






Tritten, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
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TABLE XII
NORTHERN FLEET - CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
Assumed No. No. Out Rapid Surge Mobilization
Total of Area Total Threat Total Threat
Low High Low High
STRATEGIC FORCES 8 3 0 1 2 3
Typhoon 4 1 0 1 1 2
Delta/Yankee 4 1 0 1 1 2
ACTIVE LONG-RANGE
MARITIME FORCES
STRIKE SUBMARINES 134 4 40 63 86 96
SSGN/SSG 33 1 10 16 21 24
SSN/SS 101 3 30 47 64 73
SURFACE STRIKE 9 2 3 5 6 7
CV 1 0 1 1 1
CVHG 0 0 0 0 0
CGN/CG 5 2 3 3 4
CC/CL 0 0 0 0 0
DDG 3 1 2 2 2
SURFACE ASW 9 0 3 5 6 7
CHG 0 0 0 0 0
CG/DDG 9 3 5 6 7
SURFACE ESCORTS 13 1 4 7 9 10
DDG/FFG 13 3 6 8 9
MINE WARFARE 21 7 10 14 16
MCS/MCM 1 0 1 1 1
MSF 19 6 10 13 15
AMPHIBIOUS 9 3 4 6 6
LPD (522) 0 0 0 0 0
LST (250 avg) 8 3 4 6 6
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 61 1 19 30 40 45
Bombers 26 8 13 17 19
MPAIASW 36 12 18 24 27
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TABLE Xll
NORTHERN FLEET - CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
Assumed No. No. Out Rapid Surge Mobilization
Total of Area Total Threat Total Threat
ACTIVE THEATER MARITIME
FORCES
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 4 1 2 2 3
SUBS-SSBN
ATTACK SUBMARINES-SSN/SS 15 1 4 7 9 11
THEATER SURFACE 38 12 19 25 28
FF/FFL 38 12 19 25 28
PATROL COMBATANTS 7 2 3 5 5
PGG/PPGH 7 2 3 5 5
PG 6 2 3 4 5
MINE WARFARE 43 14 22 29 32
MSF 20 6 10 13 15
MSC 23 8 12 16 18
AMPHIBIOUS- LSM (180) 7 2 3 5 5
THEATER AIRCRAFT 124 41 62 83 93
Bombers 34 11 17 23 26
Fighter-Bombers 30 10 15 20 22
MPNASW 60 20 30 40 45
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TABLE XIII
PACIFIC FLEET - CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
Assumed No. No. Out Rapid Surge Mobilization
Total of Area Total Threat Total Threat
Low High Low High
STRATEGIC FORCES 24 2 8 12 16 18
Typhoon 2 0 1 1 2 2
Delta/Yankee 22 2 6 10 13 15
ACTIVE LONG-RANGE MARITIME
FORCES
STRIKE SUBMARINES 91 4 30 45 61 68
SSGN/SSG 33 1 11 16 22 24
SSN/SS 58 3 18 27 37 41
SURFACE STRIKE 10 2 3 4 6 6
CV 0 0 0 0 0
CVHG 2 1 1 1 2
CGN 1 0 0 1 1
CG 4 1 2 3 3
CC/CL 0 0 0 0 0
DDG 3 1 2 2 2
SURFACE ASW 9 4 2 3 4 4
CHG 0 0 0 0 0
CG 6 2 3 4 5
DDG 3 1 1 2 2
SURFACE ESCORTS 19 2 6 9 12 13
DDG/FFG 19 6 10 13 15
MINE WARFARE 30 2 9 14 19 21
MCS/MCM 11 4 5 7 8
MSF 19 6 10 13 15
AMPHIBIOUS 9 1 3 4 5 6
LPD (522) 0 0 0 0 0
LST (230-300) 8 3 4 6 6
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TABLE XIII
PACIFIC FLEET - CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
Assumed No. No. Out Rapid Surge Mobilization
Total of Area Total Threat Total Threat
LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT 72 1 23 36 48 53
Bombers 50 16 25 33 37
MPA/ASW 23 7 11 15 17
ACTIVE THEATER MARITIME
FORCES
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 4 1 2 2 3
SUBS-SSBN
ATTACK SUBMARINES- SSN/SS 15 1 8 7 10 11
THEATER SURFACE 23 8 11 15 17
FF/FFL 23 8 11 15 17
PATROL COMBATANTS 13 4 6 9 10
PGG/PPGH 6 2 3 4 4
PG/PGF 7 2 4 5 5
MINE WARFARE 43 14 22 29 32
MSF 20 6 10 13 15
MSC 23 8 12 16 18
AMPHIBIOUS- LSM (180) 4 1 2 3 3
THEATER AIRCRAFT 194 64 97 130 145
Bombers 66 22 33 44 49
Fighter-Bombers 71 23 36 48 53
MPA/ASW 57 19 29 38 43
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TABLE XIV
BLACK SEA FLEET - CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
Assumed No. No. Out Rapid Surge Mobilization
Low High Low High
STRATEGIC FORCES 0 0 0 0 0
Typhoon 0 0 0 0 0
Delta/Yankee 0 0 0 0 0
ACTIVE LONG-RANGE
STRIKE SUBMARINES 9 3 5 6 7
SSGN/SSG 2 1 1 1 1
SSN/SS 9 3 5 6 7
SURFACE STRIKE 7 2 2 3 3 4
CV 0 0 0 0 0
CVHG 1 0 1 1 1
CGN 0 0 0 0 0
CG 2 1 1 2 2
CC/CL 0 0 0 0 0
DDG 0 0 0 0 0
SURFACE ASW 7 5 1 1 1 2
CHG 0 0 0 0 0
CG/DDG 7 2 3 5 5
SURFACE ESCORTS 15 2 4 7 9 10
DDG/FFG 15 5 8 10 12
MINE WARFARE 23 3 7 10 14 15
MCS/MCM 2 1 1 1 1
MSF 22 7 11 14 16
AMPHIBIOUS 8 3 2 2 3 3
LPD (522) 0 0 0 0 0
LST (300) 8 3 4 5 6
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TABLE XIV
BLACK SEA FLEET - CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
Assumed No. No. Out Rapid Surge Mobilization
LONG-RANGE AIRCRAFT 65 21 32 43 48
Bombers 41 13 20 27 30
MPA'ASW 24 8 12 16 18
ACTIVE THEATER
ATTACK SUBMARINES 0 0 0 0 0
ATTACK SUBMARINES-SS 9 3 4 6 7
THEATER SURFACE 36 12 18 24 27
FF/FFL 36 12 18 24 27
PATROL COMBATANTS 24 2 7 11 15 17
PGG/PPGH 11 4 5 7 8
PG/PGF 14 5 7 9 10
MINE WARFARE 48 16 24 32 36
MSF 22 7 11 15 16
MSC 26 9 13 17 20
AMPHIBIOUS- LSM (180) 14 5 7 10 11
THEATER AIRCRAFT 126 0 42 63 85 95
Bombers 58 19 29 39 44
Fighter-bombers 49 16 24 33 37
MPA/ASW 0 0 0 0 0
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TABLE XV
BALTIC FLEET - CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
Assumed No. No. Out Rapid Surge Mobilization
Total of Area Total Threat Total Threat
Low High Low High
STRATEGIC FORCES 21 7 11 14 16
Typhoon 0 0 0 0 0
Delta/Yankee 0 0 0 0 0
ACTIVE LONG-RANGE MARITIME FORCES
STRIKE SUBMARINES 21 7 11 14 16
SSGN-SSG 4 1 2 3 3
SSN/SS 17 6 9 12 13
SURFACE STRIKE 5 1 1 2 3 3
CV 0 0 0 0 0
CVHG 0 0 0 0 0
CGN/CG 2 1 1 1 1
CC/CL 1 0 0 1 1
DDG 2 1 1 1 2
SURFACE ASW 4 0 1 2 2 3
CHG 0 0 0 0 0
CG/DDG 4 1 2 2 3
SURFACE ESCORTS 11 7 1 2 2 3
DDG/FFG 11 4 5 7 8
MINE WARFARE 41 13 20 27 30
MCS/MCM 3 1 1 2 2
MSF 38 12 19 25 28
AMPHIBIOUS 9 1 3 4 5 6
LPD (552) 0 0 0 0 0
LST (250 avg) 9 3 5 6 7
LONG RANGE AIRCRAFT 38 1 12 19 25 28
Bombers 30 10 15 20 23
MPA/ASW 8 3 4 5 6
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TABLE XV
BALTIC FLEET - CONTIGUOUS WATERS CAPABILITY
Assumed No. No. Out Rapid Surge Mobilization
Total of Area Total Threat Total Threat
ACTIVE THEATER MARITIME FORCES
THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE 0 0 0 0 0
SUBS-SSBN
ATTACK SUBMARINES- SSN/SS 17 0 5 8 11 12
THEATER SURFACE 28 9 14 18 21
FF/FFL 28 9 14 18 21
PATROL COMBATANTS 41 13 20 27 31
PGG/PPGH 18 6 9 12 13
PG/PGF 23 8 12 15 17
MINE WARFARE 167 55 83 112 125
MSF 121 40 61 81 91
MSC 46 15 23 30 34
AMPHIBIOUS - LSM (180) 10 3 5 6 7
THEATER AIRCRAFT 74 24 37 49 55
Bombers 40 13 20 27 30
Fighter-Bombers 20 7 10 13 15
MPA/ASW 14 4 7 9 10
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VII. FUTURE SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE
The second part of the problem addresses the future structure of the Soviet
Navy. This is a very difficult task because as far as we know the Soviets
themselves do not know what this structure will be. In order to characterize their
needs, we put ourselves in the position of the Soviet General Staff and ask what
must we have under the new defensive doctrine and strategy.
We make many assumptions throughout this section. We feel that these are
reasonable assumptions. For example, it is assumed that the Soviet units will act
in task groups rather than as individual ships. This conforms to past behavior, it
is the assumption made by Prof. Tritten in his data base and there is no reason




Ballistic Missile Submarines Individual units
Air Supplemented Anti-Carrier Warfare One CVHG or Bomber unit'
(ACW) Group One CGN/CG/major DDG
Two DDG/FFG/DD/FF
One SSGNISSG (if available)
Two SSN/SS (three if no SSGN/SSG)




Ballistic Missile Submarines Individual units
Air Supplemented Anti-Submarine One CVHG/CHG or MPAIASW unita
Warfare (ASW) Group One CGN/CG/major DDG
Two DDG/FFG/DD/FF
Three SSN/SS
ACW Group Same as above less CVHG/bombers
ASW Group Same as above less CVGH/CHG/ASW air
Submarine Warfare Group Three SSGN/SSG/SSN/SS
Surface Action Group 1-2 CVHG/CHG/CGN/CG/major DDG/CL
3-4 DDG/FFG/DD/FF
Marine Amphibious Unit 1 CG/CL if available
3-4 DDG/FFG/DD/FF/FFL depending on CG/CL
Sufficient Amphibious ships to land 1000 troops
Surface Group 4 DD/FF/FFL
Patrol/Coastal Combat Group 5 Patrol/Coastal Combatants with occasional
larger unit or miscellaneous ship (AXT)
Minesweeping Group 5 mine warfare ships
Bomber Unit (Long-Range or Theater) 20 Aircraft. If theater, may include fighter-bombers
as escorts
MPAASW Unit (Long-Range or Theater) 5 Aircraft. May have fighter escorts
Fighter-Bomber Unit (Theater) 20 Aircraft. No escorts required
To decide how many of each type of task group is necessary for the
geographic fleets the nature of the Soviet Union's present and future situation is
considered. Here we make several broad assumptions.
1. The changes in the Soviet Union are not only caused by economics
but are also social and political.
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2. Because of these changes and the poor state of the economy,
major military reductions are likely. Therefore, their stated policy of
defensive defense is genuine.
3. Being primarily a land power, military cuts will also and perhaps
more severely affect the navy.
4. A war with the United States and/or NATO is not likely in the near
future and there will be two years warning time in which to mobilize
for such a war.
5. The break up of the Warsaw Pact means that there are more
potential enemies on the Soviet border, for example Poland,
Bulgaria, Romania and what was previously East Germany.
6. While the choke points around the Soviet Union make large
numbers of units necessary for an offensive mission, they ease the
requirements for accomplishing defensive goals.
In summary, the Soviet Union is in a situation where there is a real and vital
need for defensive forces. In the foreseeable future, however, there is no
immediate threat to the homeland from the United States, NATO or the border
countries. A major war is not likely to result from some peripheral contingency
operations as was feared during the height of the cold war and there will be a
somewhat extended period of warning and indication prior to a major conflict. In
the final analysis, the numbers assumed are arbitrary (the researcher's best
estimate) and illustrative. If other readers have a better view, they should keep the
logic and methodology, and substitute their own numbers.
Based upon the above assumptions, what would the Soviet General Staff
have for priorities if told to make severe reductions? Reluctant to abandon the
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Navy's blue water ambitions, we suggest, the General Staff would seek to achieve
the following:
1. Protection for strategic forces.
2. Protect the borders and extend the air defense envelope.
3. Ability to protect the flank of the army as part of defensive defense
such as tactical missions on the army's flank.
4. Maintain an anti-landing defense capability.
5. Ability to conduct tactical amphibious operations against little or no
resistance on Soviet soil to show presence or if invited back by a
former Warsaw Pact host.
6. Protect against smuggling, fishing rights violations and other such
transgressions.
7. Maintain an adequately trained base from which to build up an
offensive force if necessary.
To meet the above objectives the Northern and Pacific fleets would homeport
the strategic and longer range forces while the Baltic and Black fleets would have
regional goals. Again the forces required to meet an unexpected attack or to give
us a rapid surge capability would be fewer than if there is a tension building phase
before hostilities with a chance to mobilize. Considering all of the above we
suggest a future Soviet Naval structure as shown in the Table XVII.
From Table XVII it is easy to calculate the number of Soviet Navy forces
necessary to accomplish "defensive defense." We calculate the total number of
forces required in the following manner. Since each ship type may appear in more
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than one task group and the group appears in one or more of the fleets, the
formulas are quite long for this process. The easiest way to explain this is by
example. If we sum up the strike submarines, this will be the number of strike subs
in an ACW group multiplied by the summation of the number of groups required
for each fleet plus the number of subs in an ASW group times the summation of
the number of ASW groups required for each fleet etc. Table XVIII is a summation
of the required number of units to meet the mobilization threat.
TABLE XVIII












Although Table XVIII shows the number of forces required for "defensive
defense," these are only the numbers of ships required in contiguous waters -
ready to fight. Since no navy deploys 100% of its force in contiguous waters, we
need to add deployed units and the ships that are not deployable due to scheduled
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and unscheduled overhaul and maintenance. Essentially, we reverse the success
used to create Tables XII-XV.
We therefore calculate the total number needed in Table XIX with the
mobilization scenario used to create the highest possible numbers for the Soviet
Navy. The lesser threat of a rapid surge will be absorbed by these higher numbers.
TABLE XIX.












Having arrrived at revised numbers required under "defense defense," we
now sum up the totals currently available. We do this by summing the categories















The excess forces in the Soviet Navy under "defense defense" are simply
what they have now (Table XX) minus what they need (Table XIX). The result is















VIII. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
There are three main areas of concern with regard to naval arms control
strategy. These are strategic forces, the Soviet aircraft carrier program and the
non-strategic forces. Before summarizing our conclusions concerning naval arms
control strategy, let us again emphatically state that we do not advocate naval
arms control as being in the best interest of the United States. If anything, the
likelihood that the Soviet Union will reduce its naval force structure due to internal
pressures suggests that we may have little to gain. But if we are, however
reluctantly, required to negotiate naval arms control treaties with the Soviets, the
above methodology is useful in identifying the excess that can be targeted by the
United States.
For the Soviets, naval strategic forces equates to SSBNs. Because the
Soviets view the SSBN force in this manner, limitations upon these ships can not
be considered without linking them to total numbers of nuclear warheads. A year
ago it was evident that large reductions in the world nuclear arsenal would occur.
Now it is clear that these cutbacks will be more severe than anyone predicted.
With the USSR accepting 6,000 stratetic nuclear warheads under START, one's
first idea may be to assume a 50/50 distribution of those warheads between land
based and sea based. With the breakup of the Soviet Union though, it is clear that
the Kremlin has two problems. First, the Soviet leaders must maintain positive
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control of their strategic arsenal and second, they do not wish to concentrate all
of their missiles into a relatively small, closely controlled area. For these reasons,
we believe that the prudent Soviet military planner is likely to rely more heavily on
the mobile and controllable submarine force.
The current capability of the 63 Soviet submarines is about 4,000 warheads. 9
Given the current political situation in the Soviet Union, this does not appear to be
an area with significant excess. If we assume that military leaders would desire a
two-thirds sea based capability and one-third shore based, there is in fact no
excess based on a limit of 6,000 warheads and a current capability of 4,000.
Therefore, in this area, we conclude that a significant excess does not exist in the
Soviet's mind with regard to strategic forces and U.S. arms control planners should
not target this area.
The next aspect of the Soviet naval arsenal considered was their aircraft
carrier. The Soviets pr -bly have no need of an aircraft carrier such as the
Admiral Kuznetzov to meet the goals of "defensive defense." However, with the
Kuznetzov undergoing sea trials it is unlikely that this program will be scrapped.
Especially when one considers the decline of the Communist Party, the idea of
having an operational aircraft carrier is a big plus. The prestige associated with this
9 This number is derived by adding up the number of missiles carried by
the submarines, from Jane's Fighting Shiips, and multiplying by four - an arbitrary
factor to account for multiple warheads. Planners with access to classified
estimates could make a more detailed and accurate estimate.
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type of capital ship goes a long way in demonstrating the nation's technological
and military power.
For this reason, the expectation of the Soviets giving up this platform is
unlikely even though the ship is not essential to the defensive naval model
discussed. It is also unlikely that construction of the next carrier, already underway
would be stopped due to the long lead times and work being generated by the
construction. This would give the Soviets one carrier for each coast and be a
symbol that they are a naval as well as a land power. However, with the Soviet
economy in its current state, we feel it would be quite easy to get the Soviets to
discontinue any further carrier construction beyond the two mentioned above. In
fact, we feel that the Soviets would be so willing to suspend any expansion of the
carrier program that U.S. planners should not be willing to give up anything
significant (i.e. anything beyond that which is already planned) to limit the growth
of the Soviet carrier program, i.e., the Soviets will cut these anyway.
Finally, this leaves the area of non-strategic naval forces. The main focus of
this paper was the calculation of excess non-strategic forces and the final numbers















The most significant area for U.S. planners to concentrate on is the excess
of strike submarnes. There is a large excess (140) based on the "defensive
defense" force posture described in this thesis. For years the Soviet submarine
force was (and still is) a major concern of the U.S. Navy. The Soviet submarine
force should be the West's primary target at the negotiating table.
We have calculated that there is a negative excess (i.e. a deficit) of surface
strike forces and surface ASW totalling 15. A review of Table IV Miscellaneous
Forces shows that there are 20 reserve surface units and 574 excesss theater
surface craft which could be activated to fill this gap. Theater surface units should
be targets for arms control efforts done in conjunction with allies.
In summary, this thesis does not advocate arms control. In fact, we feel that
many of the excesses that we calculated will be reduced unilaterally by the
Soviets. If the United States Navy is forced to the bargaining table, the
66
methodology presented here is a valid one. The exact numbers and precise future
make up of the Soviet Navy are open to criticism, but the method of assessing
fruitful areas to obtain naval arms reduction is valid. Finally, the only significant
area of concern to U.S. planners appears to be in the area of strike submarines




Active Long Range All active strike submarines, surface strike and
Maritime Forces surface ASW vessels, surface escorts, mine
warfare ships in excess of 1000 tons, amphibious
LPD/LSTs, and long range aircraft. See individual
categories for definitions. Generally refers to units
capable of distant water operations.
Active Theater Maritime Hotel II and Golf II ballistic missile submarines,
Forces attack submarines, surface units, patrol
combatants, mine warfare ships from 100-1000
tons, amphibious LSM, and theater aircraft. See
individual categories for definitions. Generally refers
to units likely to operate under protective umbrella
of land based aviation.
ACW Anti-carrier warfare.
Amphibious Forces Ships having the organic capability to carry troops
(number in parentheses) and equipment. Does not
include Soviet Merchant Marine Assets which are
not under routine control of Navy but could
significantly increase distant water operations in a
more benign environment.
ASW Anti-submarine warfare
Attack Submarine Active SS and SSC of K, Q, R, W, Z classes not
assigned training roles (active theater maritime
forces).
AXT Training ship. Counted as Auxiliary warship. Certain
of these units are well armed and could be a
valuable wartime asset. Where armament is
significant, counted in Misc. surface forces.
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AXT/MM A Yugoslavian ship primarily operated as a training
ship but credited with a possible minelaying role in
war.
BIk-COM 1 A NATO designation used to give a provisional
name to a combatant being built in the Black Sea.
In this case, the unit has been identified as a
cruiser.
CG Missile cruiser. Principal surface combatant with
extensive command and control capability and
armament. Armed with surface-to-surface missiles
whose range exceeds 60 n mi, or ASW missiles
whose range exceeds 20 n me, or surface-to-air
missiles whose range exceeds 10 n mi. Udaloy and
Sovremenny class major DDGs meet this test and
are larger than Kynda class cruisers.
CG/CL Used herein to designate Sverdlov class cruiser.
Only one has surface-to-air missiles while a few
have been extensively modified for command and
control and had previously been termed CC instead
of the present CL.
CGN Nuclear powered cruiser. See CG.
CHG Aviation cruiser. Carries at least 4 helicopters. See
CG.
CL Light cruiser. Similar to CG but lacks missiles. Has
multiple-barrel main gun batteries of 100-180-mm
bore.
Coastal Combatants Naval units classed between patrol combatants and
river/roadstead craft. Generally lack endurance for
operations outside inshore waters and between
100-400 metric tons displacement. Includes PCF,
PCS, PCSH, PT, PTG, PTGH, PTH (miscellaneous
forces).
CVHG V/STOL aircraft carrier. Capable of operating at
least 4 vertical/short field take off and landing
(V/STOL) aircraft. Armed with surface-to-surface
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missiles whose range exceeds 60 n mi, or ASW
missiles whose range exceeds 20 n mi, or surface-
to-air missiles whose range exceeds 10 n mi.
DD Destroyer. A general purpose surface warship
capable off independent open ocean operations.
Classed between cruisers and frigates. Functions
primarily as an escort or in-shore bombardment.
DDG Missile destroyer. See DD. See CG for criteria to
be considered missile equipped.
FF Frigate. Open ocean combatant classed between
destroyers and corvettes. Generally not multi-
purpose although can act as such but lack
capability of destroyer. At least 1500 metric tons
displacement and capable of >20 kts sustained
speed.
FFG Missile frigate. See FF. See CG for criteria to be
considered missile equipped.
FFL Corvette. Open ocean combatant classed between
frigates and patrol combatants. Generally lack
multi-purpose capability. Fall between 900-1500
metric tons displacement and capable of >20 kts
sustained speed.
FF/MM Refers to Finland frigate of Soviet Riga class
modified to perform as minelayer.
FFT Training frigate. See FF. Refers to Iraq Ibn
Khaldum.
KGB Forces Naval-type combatants operated by the Frontier
Forces of the KGB. Such vessels fly a distinct
Naval Ensign and are not properly counted as
being in the Navy. Some are corvette sized but
most are patrol or coastal combatants. Units in this
force have a W preceding naval ship class
designation. Includes WFF, WFFL, WPCS, and
WPGF (miscellaneous forces).
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Long-range Aircraft Backfire bombers and Bear F MPA/ASW fixed wing
aircraft (long range maritime forces).
LPD Amphibious assault transport dock. Major long
range, deep water ship capable of launching
assault vehicles via wet well. Helicopter capable.
Soviet Ivan Rogov class.
LSM Medium amphibious assault landing ship. Capable
of extended open ocean operation but primarily
expected to be used in theater role. <600 metric
tons cargo.
LST Amphibious vehicle landing ship. Capable of
extended open ocean operation. >600 metric tons
cargo.
Major DDG Sovremenny and Udaloy classes. Armament meets
criteria of being a CG. Ships are larger than Kynda
class cruisers. Jane's classifies as CG.
MCS Mine countermeasures support ship. Provides
command, control, and communications, support for
other mine countermeasures ships. Probably has
minelaying capability. Soviet Alesha class of 2,630
metric tons (frigate sized.
Miscellaneous Forces R&D ballistic missile submarines, reserve attack
submarines, miscellaneous submarines,
miscellaneous surface forces not elsewhere
classifiable, coastal combatants, reserve surface,
and KGB forces. See individual categories for
definitions.
Miscellaneous Y SSBN undergoing conversion to SSN, all SSA,
Submarines SSQ, SSR, SST, SSTG (miscellaneous forces).
Misc. Surface Forces Armed AXT and PGR (miscellaneous forces).
MM Minelayer
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MM/AKR Minelayer/roll on-roll off cargo ship. Refers to a
Libyan 2800 metric ton transport which has been
used as a minelayer.
MPA Maritime patrol aircraft. Fixed wing.
MSC Coastal minesweeper. Normally between 250-500
metric tons. Probably capable of patrol duties and
minelaying.
MSF Fleet minesweeper. Open ocean capability. Might
have ASW and patrol capability. Probably capable
of minelaying. Generally >500 metric tons.
NSWTO Non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty Organization Nations.
Patrol Combatants A combatant classed between larger corvettes
(FFL) and smaller coastal combatants. Intended for
coastal defense but beyond inshore waters.
Generally <20 kts sustained speed and between
400-900 metric tons displacement. Includes PG,
PGF, PGG, PGGH (active theater maritime forces).
PCF Fast patrol craft. Coastal combatant with sustained
speeds >24 kts.
PCS Submarine chaser. Coastal combatant oriented to
ASW.
PCSH Hydrofoil submarine chaser. See PCS.
PG Patrol combatant. Main gun at least 76-mm.
PGF Patrol ship. Gun armed patrol combatant with <20
kt sustained speed.
PGG Missile patrol combatant. See PG. Armed with
some type missile of any range.
PGGH Hydrofoil missile patrol combatant. See PG and
PGG.
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PGR Reconnaissance patrol combatant. Miscellaneous
naval surface ship fitted with early warning radar.
Generally these are converted T-43 and T-58 MSF.
PT Torpedo boat. Coastal combatant. May have limited
ASW capability.
PTG Missile torpedo boat. Coastal combatant equipped
with antiship missiles vice torpedoes.
PTGH Hydrofoil missile torpedo boat. See PTG.
PTH Hydrofoil torpedo boat. See PT.
R&D Ballistic Missile Hotel III SSBN, Golf I, Ill, IV, V class SSB
Subs (miscellaneous forces).
Reserve Attack Q, W, and Z class SS/SSC assigned to reserve
Submarines fleet (miscellaneous forces).
Reserve Surface CG/CL, DD, FF, and MSF assigned to reserve fleet
(miscellaneous forces).
SS Attack or strike submarines. Diesel-electric
powered, torpedoes and mines are main armament.
Soviet F, K, R, T, W, Z classes.
SSA Auxiliary submarine. Non-combatant. Soviet I and
L classes.
SSB Ballistic missile submarine. Diesel-electric powered.
Soviet G class.
SSBN Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine. Soviet
D, H, Y, and Typhoon classes.
SSC Coastal submarine. Short endurance defensive
coastal operations. Normally <1400 metric tons
submerged displacement. Soviet Q class in reserve
fleet.
SSG Cruise missile submarine. Diesel-electric powered.
Soviet J class.
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SSGN Nuclear powered cruise missile submarine. Soviet
C, E, 0, P classes.
SSM Surface-to-surface missiles.
SSN Nuclear powered attack or strike submarine. Soviet
A, E, N, V classes.
SSQ Communications submarine. Non-combatant Soviet
G-I conversions.
SSR Radar picket submarine. Soviet W class modified to
carry early warning radar.
SST Training submarine. Soviet B class used as target
and 0 submarines assigned as training units.
SSTG Cruise missile training submarine. Soviet modified
W class.
Strategic Forces Nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines
accountable under SALT I.
Strike Submarines Active SSGN and SSNs (all), J, SSG, F, and T SS.
These units are those currently forward deployed or
likely to do so in event of war (long range maritime
forces).
Surface ASW All CHG and those CG and major DDG whose
major weapons systems indicate ASW as the
primary missions (long-range maritime forces).
Surface Escorts All DDG and FFG (long-range maritime forces).
Surface Strike All CVHGs, and CGNs and those CG, Cl, major
DDG whose major weapons systems indicate a
surface strike role as a primary mission (long range
maritime forces).
Theater Aircraft Badger and Blinder bombers, Fitter and Forger
fighter/bombers, Mail and May MPA/ASW fixed
wing aircraft (active theater maritime forces).
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Theater Ballistic Missile SSBN, SSBs of Hotel II and Golf II classes (active
Submarines theater maritime forces).
Theater Surface DD, FF, FFL lacking missiles (active theater
maritime forces).
Warship The Soviets claim that any State-owned ship which
flies the Naval Ensign or the flags of the Auxiliary
Vessels, Hydrographic Vessels, or Emergency
Reserve Vessels of the Soviet Navy are warships
or the legal equivalent of warships. Such ships do
not need to be painted gray, have armament, or
have an all-military crew.
WFF KGB frigate. See FF.
WFFL KGB Corvette. See FFL.
WPCS KGB submarine chaser. See PCS.
WPGF KBG patrol ship. See PGF.
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